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Skip Atwater
Origins of the Ft. Meade RV Program

The Plan

I explained that first we needed to determine if hostile exploitation of the remote-viewing phenomenon posed a probable threat. It was obvious from open-source material (newspapers, magazines, books, etc.) and published classified documents that remote viewing constituted a possible threat but that until we could demonstrate its probable exploitation by hostile intelligence, there was no need to address the concept of countermeasures.

Keenan smiled and said, “You've been thinking about this, haven't you Lieutenant?” He asked what I planned to do next. I told him that I needed to see if there were more, or more up-to-date, classified documents on remote viewing, and that I needed to check to see if there were any outstanding Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICRs) for the hostile exploitation of remote viewing. (The CIA compiled a list of ICRs, as they were called back then, to address the identified needs of the intelligence community. This list sometimes chartered specific agencies to obtain the information, but many ICRs invited contributions from any appropriate organization.)

I explained that if I could demonstrate the probable exploitation of this unique human perceptual ability by hostile intelligence services, we had an obligation to address countermeasures with our OPSEC expertise and policy. Keenan brought our short meeting to a close by saying, “You're probably right, Lieutenant. Find out what you can and get back to me when you've got something substantial.”

“Yes Sir.” I picked up my papers and left his office.

My course had been set—in more ways than I was aware. The classified documents that I had listed the publishing offices and it took little effort to query those offices for updated material.

In my search I found another secret document prepared by the Air Force Systems Command, Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, and published by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This document was called Paraphysics R&D-Warsaw Pact. This was a very comprehensive review on the state of the parapsychology research in the Soviet Union and Warsaw-Pact countries. It detailed personnel involved in the research, institutions, and funding.

I reviewed the classified ICRs and found that the Air Force was responding to a list requirements for information on remote-viewing and psychic phenomena. I discovered that there was a civilian employee at DIA by the name of Jim Salyer who was the point of contact with DIA on this subject, among other things. Jim was a somewhat standoffish fellow but he had been involved with DIA’s remote-viewing interests for sometime. He was the first government official that I met who knew what was going on in this field.

When I asked about the work at SRI by Puthoff and Targ, Mr. Salyer explained that in response to outstanding ICRs published by the CIA, information about Soviet remote-viewing experiments (and those of other nations as well) had been collected. He said that in the case of intelligence information about foreign remote-viewing experiments, one way to determine the probable truth of the information was to replicate the reported experiments.

Salyer said that this was the basis for the government-funded remote-viewing research at SRI. They were reproducing the experiments to see if the reported successes in remote viewing by Soviet and other foreign research facilities were valid. From time to time the CIA themselves would task SRI’s remote viewers against the CIA’s own foreign targets of interest. Some of those “test” results have been published elsewhere.

I learned from Mr. Salyer that an Air Force civilian employee by the name of Dale Graff was the point of contact at Air Force Systems Command, Foreign Technology Division. Dale was the principle author of Paraphysics R&D-Warsaw Pact. Before leaving DIA, I ask Mr. Salyer how to get in touch with Dale and he provided the necessary contact information.

"I had found evidence to demonstrate the probable exploitation of remote viewing by hostile intelligence services."

I took a trip out to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio to meet Dale Graff. Dale was a soft-spoken, mid-level civilian employee whose intellect far exceeded his job assignment. He had been investigating remote viewing on his own for years. He was genuinely interested in my inquiry and candidly reviewed the material about foreign research on remote viewing and other psychic phenomena with me without holding anything back.

It was clear from what Dale showed me, that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the principle-funding source for this research was the KGB. The presumption was that the KGB was investigating remote-viewing surveillance as a possible source of intelligence information.

Coupling this hypothesis with the remote-viewing success in the government-funded SRI research, it looked to me as though I had found evidence to demonstrate the probable exploitation of remote viewing by hostile intelligence services.

As I made inquires around the intelligence community I found others who agreed with me. But how was I going to explain all this to Major Keenan? If he understood the OPSEC implications of what I had discovered, then what would he have me do next? I decided the best course of action would be to ask the authoritative Mr. Salyer from the DIA if he would come to Fort Meade and brief Keenan.

Within in a week, Mr. Salyer, Major Keenan, and I were sitting around that small conference table in Keenan’s office. Salyer explained that the US Government had been following remote-viewing research for some time but only recently had taken an increased interest when evidence of KGB funding of the Soviet effort came to light.

He reviewed the efforts of SRI to replicate Soviet experiments and showed us some results. I confirmed, for discussion purposes, that researchers Puthoff and Targ, the authors of MIND-REACH, were the ones under government contract. Salyer showed several startling examples in which SRI’s remote viewers had correctly described strategic military facilities in the Soviet Union. The implication for OPSEC was vividly clear. If KGB remote viewers were targeted against US facilities, similar results could be expected.

The DIA briefing lasted about forty-five minutes and after courteous handshakes all around, Mr. Salyer and I left Major Keenan’s office. I walked Salyer to the door and thanked him for the briefing. Watching him descend the stairs on his way out of the building I wasn't sure if this would be the end of my involvement with military remote viewing or perhaps, the beginning of an even deeper participation. As I was returning to my desk, Keenan leaned out of his office doorway and said, “Lieutenant Atwater, be in my office at 0900 hours tomorrow morning.”

The next morning I woke up earlier than usual. I thought the briefing had gone well. Rather than Lieutenant Atwater, the junior officer, telling my commander that I had found evidence that remote viewing constituted a probable threat to national security, an official representative of the DIA had presented the argument for me.

Skip Atwater
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·Paul Smith

·Determining Dates
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