Page 6

Skip Atwater
Origins of the Ft. Meade RV Program

The Approval, continued

“Remote viewing,” I began, “is a natural perceptual faculty defined as the human ability to describe locations, activities, or objects using the power of the mind without the use of our conventional senses.”

“What do you mean, Lieutenant? Give me an example.”

“Yes Sir. If Major Keenan, for example, were asked as an intelligence officer to describe the current activities at a particular Soviet weapons depot, he would probably want to review current intercept traffic and look at any overhead satellite surveillance that might be on file. If activity at the depot was considered a particularly critical target, perhaps having been identified as an indicator of hostile intentions, there might even be some HUMINT (informants or agents paid by US intelligence) available as well.

Still another way for him to find out about the current activities at this supposed Soviet weapons depot would be through remote viewing. An experienced remote viewer might be able to accurately describe, by mental means alone, elements or goings-on at this Soviet depot. These descriptions could provide corroborative or additional information to intelligence analysts.”

“Is this remote viewing some sort of mental telepathy sort of thing?”

I went on, adjusting my comments to address his question. “The concept of telepathy implies some sort of mind-to-mind exchange of information. Remote viewing, as presently understood, would appear to be different. If, by way of example here, we were able to contact a Soviet soldier at this supposed weapons depot by means of telepathy, any intelligence provided through such contact would be limited to that soldier’s knowledge of the site. It would seem that remote viewing does not have this limitation. An experienced, reliable remote viewer could describe aspects of the depot, perspectives and activities beyond the confines or perceptions of personnel located there.”

“But Lieutenant, is such a thing possible?” he asked as he leaned forward in his chair.

“Yes Sir, it is,” Keenan interrupted and then pointed at me, “you only have a few minutes with the general, so move along Atwater.”

“Yes Sir," I replied.” Structuring my remaining time I continued, “General, I will be discussing four topics of interest to you. First, scientific evaluation and proof of remote viewing; second, KGB funding of Soviet research, which implies hostile intelligence exploitation of the phenomenon; third, INSCOM’s OPSEC responsibilities; and finally Major Keenan’s proposed course of action for SED. Our purpose here is to get your approval for this proposed course of action.”

“I don't have time for all that, Lieutenant. Do those documents there on the table in front of you cover all that stuff, the scientific proof and the Soviet activities and all that?” he asked bluntly.

“Yes Sir, with the exception of our proposed course of action,” I said slowly and pensively.

“Well,” he barked, “what do you propose to do about all this?”

Cautiously, I continued, “During a recent survey at the Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama . . .”

“Yes,” he snarled, “I know where the US Army Missile Command is.”

“Sir,” I raised my voice and looked directly at him, “the Missile Command has officially asked us here at INSCOM what OPSEC measures should be taken to counter the threat of Soviet remote-viewing surveillance.”“Oh.” He turned toward Major Keenan, “What are we going to do about this, Major?”

Keenan gestured toward me with a nod and said with a go-get-’em wink, “Tell him, Lieutenant. Tell him what we are going to do, and get the general’s signature on that budget document you brought with you.”

General Smith turned and looked me right in the eye as I told him what we would do. “SED will train professional intelligence personnel with high-level security clearances, people like those here in the conference room right now, in this remote-viewing skill.”

“Once trained, these trusted personnel will be able to provide remote-viewing descriptions of US Army installations and commands. These descriptions will provide us with an accurate means to assess OPSEC vulnerabilities to hostile remote-viewing surveillance of these same organizations.”

“It is our opinion, General Smith, that this issue is of vital importance to national security and that INSCOM has a responsibility to provide the appropriate OPSEC support to US Army activities. Further, because Major Keenan’s detachment, SED, is the lead element in INSCOM’s OPSEC effort, it is the logical and appropriate national-level organization to head this operation.”

“This sounds like a good idea,” the general said, “but how are you going to train these folks?”

With that, I picked up the budget request I brought with me and (avoiding his direct question) replied, “Since this training clearly falls outside the parameters of this fiscal-year’s budget, you as Deputy Commander need to approve this course of action.”

Skip Atwater
Page 7

Privacy Statement

Copyright © 2001,H.R.V.G.
All rights reserved.
·Skip Atwater
   Page 2
   Page 3
   Page 4
   Page 5
   Page 6
   Page 7
   Page 8
   Page 9

·Paul Smith

·Determining Dates
   Page 2
   Sketch 1
   Sketch 2
   Sketch 3

·Discussions on RV
   Sketch 1
   Sketch 2
   Sketch 3

·The CRV Conference